Laboratory-acquired infections have been recogmized since the advent of microbiology as a science (8) , and safety in the laboratory is an issue which affects all microbiologists. Although those working with etiological agents are at greatest risk for acquiring infection, on occasion there has been transmission of these agents beyond the confines of the laboratory (10) .
Recently we reported that the laboratory is becoming a significant reservoir for Salmonella typhi in the United States (1) . Most of the laboratory-acquired cases of typhoid fever are due to exposure to strains of S. typhi used for proficiency testing or educational purposes rather than isolates from il patients.
In the years 1977 Since early May 1980, Mr. A had prepared the evening meal for his wife and two children (14-yearold boy and 6-year-old girl). He prepared the complete meal which frequently included a meat course, vegetables, salad, and cake. All family members partook of the meals, although on occasion missed a meal.
Beginning in early June, Mr. A subcultured the laboratory stock strains. There were 13 slants of shigellae (including 3 of Shigella dysenteriae), 6 of S. typhi, 3 (9) . These findings suggest that he may have passively transferred the organisms from the laboratory to his family, without having become infected himself.
These cases illustrate that not only are laboratory workers at risk for laboratory-acquired infections but that others with no direct contact to the laboratory may also be at risk. In the past year, three other cases of laboratory-acquired typhoid fever reported to CDC have occurred in persons who had not worked in a microbiology laboratory. One patient visited the clinical microbiology laboratory next door to the clinical chemistry laboratory in which she worked. Two other patients were college students attending an afternoon class in blood coagulation held in the same laboratory in which S. typhi had been handled in the morning. In these latter cases, exposure to contaminated counter tops may possibly have occurred.
Another situation possibly similar to that in Arkansas occurred in 1974, when a child whose mother was a microbiology laboratory technologist developed typhoid. His mother was in the habit of eating her lunch in the laboratory, and after working with S. typhi cultures (from a proficiency test), ate her lunch and then brought her half-eaten sandwich home for her son to finish. Both the proficiency test strain and the isolate from the child were phage type C1 (R. Waldman, personal communication).
Laboratory-acquired S. typhi infection can be a serious illness. In the past 3.5 years, 32 laboratory workers have been hospitalized due to laboratory-acquired typhoid; one patient had a partial colectomy (5) . This report illustrates that laboratory-acquired salmonella infections can be fatal, not only for the laboratory worker but for family members or friends. A laboratory proficiency test was the source of the S. typhi strain involved in these cases.
These two cases are the second and third cases reported in association with that particular exercise, after an interval of more than 1 year after the exercise. The source of the S. agona strain was also a laboratory proficiency exercise for identification and antimicrobial susceptibility testing. The strain that had been sent out in April 1978 was an organism with multiple antibiotic resistance which had caused an outbreak previously and which was believed to be of enhanced virulence (2) . Other laboratories may still have this strain among their stock cultures.
Virulent organisms maintained on artificial media can retain pathogenic properties indefinitely (7) .
Although proficiency testing of practicing microbiologists is desirable, the strains selected should meet several minimal criteria before dissemination. Whenever possible, strains should be selected that are of low virulence and that are sensitive to the antibiotics most commonly used for treatment of infections due to that organism. When this is not possible, laboratories should be advised as to the organism's susceptibility pattern shortly after the proficiency testing exercise. Whenever possible, strains for proficiency testing should have an unusual serotype, biotype, or other marker so that laboratory-acquired infections due to that organism could be traced. The use of a marker strain would permit tracing the transmission when infection occurs in individuals not immediately connected with a laboratory. Perhaps the S. agona strain which may have been kept as a stock culture by some of the 754 laboratories to which it was sent, should be replaced with a Salmonella strain without resistance and with an unusual serotype.
Proficiency tests per se do not cause laboratory accidents; carelessness and poor techniques are the major causes for this problem (3) . The use of human pathogens of high virulence for the testing or the education of students who have little experience in microbiology should be avoided. Because of the risk of infection not only to themselves but to others, microbiologists must be especially scrupulous about adherence to recognized standards of safety (11) .
The continuing occurrence of laboratory-acquired infections demonstrates the need for each laboratory's management to reaffirm its responsibility for safe laboratory practices, for training of personnel in safe practices, and for maintaining on-going surveillance of these practices. Safe practices should encompass not only the handling of S. typhi but that of other bacterial, fungal, or viral agents. Care should be exercised in the acquisition and testing of patients' specimens, proficiency testing samples, and stock cultures. Except in certain situations, for example, when large quantities of a known pathogen are handled for which special precautions are needed, there should be no conscious distinction in the handling of microbiological materials on the basis of conjecture as to whether or not the materials contain a pathogen; safe practices should be applied uniformly in the microbiology laboratory. 
